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How Juries Get It Wrong-Anatomy of the Detroit 
Terror Case 
Bennett L. Gershman* 
Juries make mistakes. We know this intuitively and empirically. 
Juries have acquitted guilty people1 and convicted innocent p e ~ p l e . ~  
The reasons for jury error are as varied as the reasons for human error 
generally.3 Jury errors may be attributable to factors intrinsic to a 
jury's makeup, such as the jury's attitudes, beliefs, and decision-mak- 
ing competence, which may skew its ability to evaluate the evidence 
accurately and apply the law fairly.4 Thus, for example, a jury's deter- 
mination of the facts may be influenced by sympathy, passion, and 
p r e j~d i ce .~  Similarly, a jury's evaluation of a witness's credibility may 
be distorted by the jury's subjective assessment of the witness's back- 
* Professor of Law, Pace Law School. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Vicky 
Gannon. 
1. See H. Richard Uviller, Acquitting the Guilty.. Two Case Studies on Jug! Misgivings and 
the Misunderstood Standard of Proof, 2 CRIM. L.F. 1 ,2  (examining "the unaccountable acquittal 
of a person almost certainly guilty of a crime of the utmost gravity"); WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS 
W n ~ o r n  TRUTH 201 (1999) ("Probably everyone is familiar with some juries' stunning acquit- 
tals or failures to convict in important cases in recent years."). There have been several sensa- 
tional trials that much of the public would characterize as "false acquittals." See Palricia 
Hurtado, Crown Heights Jury: Why It Didn't Add Up; Murder Trial was Marred by Missteps, 
NEWSDAY, NOV. 8,1992, at 7 (acquittal of Lemrick Nelson for murder); John L. Mitchell 8: Jeff 
Leeds, Half of Americans Disagree with Verdict Reaction: High-Voltage Joy, Angry Denounce- 
ments, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A1 (acquittal of O.J. Simpson for murder); Richard T. 
Pienciak, Twelve Who Need lo Get a Clue, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, NOV. 12. 2003, at 4 (acquittal of 
Robert Durst); Christopher Reed, Death in the Family; Hollywood Is Where the American 
Dream Is Fabricated but This Time Hollywood Has Produced a Real Life Story Abouf the 
Dream's Darkside, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 11, 1993, at 2 (trials of Lyle and Eric Menendez 
for murder); Amy Wallace & David Ferrell, Verdicts Greeted with Outrage and Disbeliej Reac- 
tion: Many Cite Videotape of Beating and Ask How Jury Could Acquit Officers. L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 1992, at A1 (acquittals of four Los Angelcs police officers for beating Rodney King). 
2. The numerous exonerations of convicted defendants based on newly-acquired DNA ev- 
idence demonstrate that juries have mistakenly relied on defective identification evidence in 
rendering guilty verdicts. See NAT'L INSTI~JTE  OF JIJSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POSTCON- 
VICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 2 (1999) ( I '  [Mlore than 
60 convictions in the United States have been vacated on the basis of DNA results."); EDWARD 
CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: 
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISII NNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996) 
(evaluating twenty-eight cases in which DNA evidence established post-trial innocence). 
3. Jury error, as discussed in this Article, is the result of mistakes in evaluating the evi- 
dence and applying the law. Such "factual error" should be distinguished from errors that result 
from a verdict that a jury considers "right" or "wrong" based on the jury's sense of justice and 
morality. See THE STORY MODEL OF JURY DECISION-MAKING AND THE "JURY NULLIFICATION 
PROBLEM," THE JURY TRIAL IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 269 (Douglas D. Koski ed., 2003) (providing 
comprehensivc discussion of "jury nullification"). 
4. The complex and controversial subject of jury decision-making has been studied exten- 
sively. See, e.g., INSIDE ME JUROR (Reid Hastie ed. 1993); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, 
JUDGING THE JURY (1986); REID Hnsrre ET AL., INSIDE T H E  JURY (1983); HARRY KALVEN, JR. 
& HANS KELSON, THE AMERICAN JURY (1971). 
5. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 4, at 131 ("Critics have also claimed that the jury is 
swayed by subjective emotions, that its verdicts are often based upon unwarranted and irrational 
sympathies and prejudice."). 
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ground, narrative, language, and demeanor.6 Finally, a jury's capacity 
to reach a reliable decision may be impaired by defects in the jurors' 
memory, perception, and cognition.' 
Apart from intrinsic errors, jury error also may result from fac- 
tors extrinsic to the jury's attitudes, beliefs, and decision-making com- 
petence. Typically, these extrinsic errors relate to the nature and 
quality of the information that has been presented to the jury as well 
as the manner in which that information has been presented by the 
lawyers.8 Thus, for example, if the evidence is defective or incom- 
plete, or its presentation has been skewed by partisan advocacy, mis- 
takes by a jury are ine~i table .~ Indeed, even if a jury has the 
intellectual and emotional competence to receive and analyze the 
proof dispassionately and accurately, its verdict is only as trustworthy 
as the reliability of the proof itself. 
6. Subjective biases may be most acute when jurors evaluate the testimony of children, 
identification witnesses, experts, and cooperating witnesses. See Dana D. Anderson, Assessing 
the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sexual Abuse Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2117, 2117 n.1 
(1996) (claiming that of the thirty child sexual abuse cases that went to trial in the1980s, more 
than half of the convictions were reversed on appeal for tainted testimony of child witnesses); 
Ayre Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice System, 12 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 289-92 (1988) (describing a study of more than two hundred felony 
cases of wrongful conviction that found misidentification to be the single largest source of error, 
accounting for more than half of cases that had one main causc); United States v. Amaral, 488 
F.2d 1148,1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (expert usually viewed by jury with an "aura of special reliability 
and trustworthiness"); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation Wiih Federul Prosecurors: Experiences of 
Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (1999) (describing how prosecutors 
and their agents manipulate the testimony of cooperating witnesses to make these witnesses 
appear more believable to the jury). 
7 .  See Richard J .  Harris e t  al., Memory for Pragmatic Implications from Courtroom Testi- 
mony, 6 BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOC'Y 494,496 (1975) (mock jury study reveals "dis- 
couraging reflections of jurors' memories of courtroom testimony"). 
8. Studies of simulated jury decision-making reveal potential "extrinsic" errors resulting 
from the introduction of inadmissible evidence, improper opening statements, improper summa- 
tion, improper cross-examination, and the impact of missing evidence. See Stanley Sue, Ronald 
E. Smith, & Cathy Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on rhe Decisions of Simulated 
Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J .  APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (1973) (finding direct correlation 
between influence of inadmissible evidence and strength of government's case so that inadmissi- 
ble evidence most prejudicial when government's case weak); Thomas A. Pyszczynski & Law- 
rence S. Wrightsman, The Effects of Opening Statements on Mock Jurors' Verdicts in a Simulated 
Criminal Trial, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 301 (1981) (suggesting that jurors unduly affected 
by prosecutor's strong opening presentation of evidence); Judy Platania & Gary Moran, Due 
Process and the Death Penally: The Role of Prosecutorial Mi~conduct in Closing Argument in 
Capiiul Trials, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 471 (1999) (juries exposed to improper prosecutorial 
statements in closing arguments recommended death penalty significantly more often than those 
not exposed to statements); Saul M. Kassiri, Lorri N. Williams & Courtney L. Saunders, Dirty 
Tricks of Cross-Examination: The Influence of Conjectural Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 373 (1990) (presumptuous cross-examination questions significantly diminished jury 
perception of expert's credibility); E n a  M. Webster, Heather N. King & Saul M. Kassin, Voices 
From an Empty Chair The Missing Witness Inference and the Jury, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31 
(1991) (references to absent witnesses have prejudicial impact on jury when witness is central to 
case). 
9. Extrinsic factors that might impair accurate jury decision-making also include conduct 
by the trial judge in administering the trial, ruling on evidence, and instructing the jury on the 
law. See BENNE~T L. GERSHMAN, TRIAL, ERROR, AND MISCONDUCT $8 1-8, at 3-119 (Lexis Law 
Publ'g 1997) (describing the various types of errors and misconduct committed by judge during 
trial); Peter David Blanck, Robert Rosenthal, & La Doris Hazard Cordell, Note, The Appeur- 
ance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Belzavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
89 (1985) (discussing how trial judges' verbal and nonverbal behavior influence jury verdicts). 
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Ideally, then, if (1) a jury has the competence to receive and eval- 
uate the proof objectively and intelligently; (2) the evidence accu- 
rately reflects the factual issues to be proved; (3) there is no additional 
evidence that would cast doubt on the reliability of the factual deter- 
minations; (4) the attorneys have contested those issues fairly and 
thoroughly; and (5) the jury has been properly instructed on the appli- 
cable legal principles and is able to comprehend and apply those prin- 
ciples, then we may be confident that the fact-finding process has 
functioned properly and the jury's verdict is free from error.1° 
The fact-finding process, needless to say, does not always func- 
tion in such an ideal manner. A recent, high-profile, federal criminal 
jury trial offers a unique opportunity to examine how the fact-finding 
process can be impaired not by flaws that are intrinsic to the jury's 
decision-making competence, but, rather, by extrinsic factors. In the 
Detroit "Sleeper Cell" terrorism trial-the first and only post-9/11 
conviction by a jury of terrorism-related charges-the jury heard com- 
pelling evidence linking the four defendants to terrorist activities.ll 
Although the trial was conducted in an emotionally charged atmos- 
phere12 that was fueled in part by the governmentY13 the jury's verdicts 
were supported by the evidence and appeared to be arrived at consci- 
10. The assumption that juries are compctcnt to understand the judge's legal instructions 
and apply those instructions is questionable. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story 
Model for Juror Decision-Making, in INSIDE THE J U K O R ,  supra note 4, at 200 (judges' instruc- 
tions are "usually abstract and often couched in unfamiliar language," and present juries with "a 
difficult one-trial learning task" that is difficult to follow); HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 4, at 126 
("[Jlurors may not always be able to follow the law as it is intended to be followed."). 
11. See Ronald J. Hansen, Feds: Guilty Verdicts Validate Terror Hunr; Critics: Split Convic- 
tions Point to Weak Evidence DETROIT NEWS, June 4, 2003, at A1 (providing overview of the 
trial). 
12. See United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (observing 
that "tensions and sensitivities were extremely high in this area, a community which includes the 
largest Middle Eastern population outside of the Middle East"); United States v. Koubriti, 252 F. 
Supp. 2d 418, 422 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (trial received "heightened level of media attention" and 
court received forty-seven requests for media credentials for the trial). Jury selection was al- 
lowed to continue despite the fact that United States forces had attacked Iraq. See David Shep- 
ardson, Defense Lawyers Want Delay in Terror Trial Due to War, DETROIT NEWS, March 21, 
2003, at 1A. 
13. United Stales Attorney General John Ashcroft, in violation of a court order barring 
public communications by parties and lawyers, referred to the case in two separate press brief- 
ings, one near the outset of the case in which he erroneously stated that the defendants arrested 
on September 17, 2001, were "suspected of having knowledge of the September 11th attacks," 
and on a second occasion when he stated that the testimony of the government's key witness had 
"been of valuc, substantial value." See Koubriti, 305 F .  Supp. 2d at 725. 
Since adverse publicity can taint a jury's evaluation of the evidence, courts have the author- 
ity to restrict extrajudicial statements by prosecutors and defense attorneys that have the poten- 
tial to impair the integrity of the trial. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984) 
("[Aldverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that 
the jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be believed."); Gentile v. State Bar of 
Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991) (upholding constitutionality of disciplinary rule barring at- 
torney from making extrajudicial statemenls that have a "substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing" a trial). 
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entiously and fairly.14 The jury's determination, then, appeared to be 
both intrinsically and extrinsically sound. 
The jury did not know, however, that the evidence it received was 
defective. Indeed, in an extraordinary confession of error, the govern- 
ment acknowledged more than a year after the verdicts that the prose- 
cution's evidence was mostly false, misleading, and incomplete and 
that the trial was riddled with prosecutorial misconduct.~5 As de- 
scribed below, the jury got it wrong, and the reasons for that outcome 
offer a stunning perspective on the vulnerability of an intrinsically 
competent jury when extrinsic factors have corrupted the integrity of 
the trial. 
Part I1 of this Article describes the background and trial of the 
four defendants in the so-called Detroit "Sleeper Cell" terrorist prose- 
cution. It examines the evidence relied on by the jury to reach its 
verdict, particularly the testimony of a key turncoat witness who ac- 
cused the defendants of participation in a terrorist conspiracy. Part I11 
examines how the jury's search for truth was corrupted by false, mis- 
leading, and incomplete proof. It identifies several extrinsic sources 
of jury error including suppressed evidence, dishonest and unreliable 
testimony, partisan experts, coaching, obstructed cross-examination, 
and inflammatory arguments. Finally, with the Detroit terrorist trial 
as the model, Part IV concludes that while the process of selecting 
juries is effective in reducing the incidence of intrinsic factors that 
might impair a jury's decision, even the most fair-minded and compe- 
tent jury is always vulnerable to extrinsic factors that might infect its 
verdict. Indeed, the Detroit case illustrates that an intrinsically com- 
petent jury able to parse the evidence and apply the law fairly and 
accurately will almost always make the wrong decision when its ver- 
dict is based on extrinsically defective evidence that has been improp- 
erly presented. 
14. Commentators viewed the verdict as a sign that the jury system works. See Lisa 
Zagaroli, Experts: Civil Rights Preserved; Jurors Showed They Could Fairly Examine Terrorism 
Case, Carefully Weigh Evidence, D E T R O ~  NEWS, June 4,2003, at 1A (according to experts, "case 
demonstrates that the jury system can work, and that even fear of terrorism can be fairly ex- 
amined in an open courtroom"). Given the high tensions and sensitivities, and in an effort to 
"lower the volume," the trial judge conducted a meticulous and extensive individual voir dire of 
each prospective juror. See Koubriri, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 728. Moreover, although the jury was 
not sequestered, it was chosen anonymously in order to protect the privacy of the jurors and the 
jury's ability to decide the case without external pressures. See Koubriti, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 420. 
The jury's verdict appears to have been carefully and conscientiously reached. The jury deliber- 
ated for seven days and returned a split verdict, convicting two defendants of the most serious 
terrorism-related charges, convicting a third defendant of the lesser count of document fraud, 
and acquitting the fourth defendant of all charges. 
15. See Government's Consolidated Response Concurring in the Defendants' Motions for a 
New Trial and Government's Motion to Dismiss Count One Without Prejudice and Memoran- 
dum of Law in Support Thereof, United States v. Koubriti. No. 01-80778 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 
2004), at http://www.news.findlaw.com/hdocsldocs/terrorismluskoubriti83lg.pdf [hereinafter 
Government Motion]. 
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A. Unearthing a Purported Terrorist Conspiracy 
Six days after the September 11,2001 attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon, Karim Koubriti, Ahmed Hannan, and Fa- 
rouk Ali-Haimoud were arrested in a Detroit apartment by a joint 
federal and state anti-terrorism task force. The agents were attempt- 
ing to locate another individual, Nabil Al-Marabh, who was on the 
FBI's "watch list" of suspected terrorists. Inside the apartment the 
agents found false identity documents, audio tapes featuring funda- 
mentalist Islamic teachings, a videotape depicting several United 
States tourist landmarks, and a notebook containing two sketches 
bearing the Arabic words "The American Air Base in Turkey under 
the Leadership of Defense Minister," and "Queen Alia, Jordan."16 
The defendants initially were charged with possessing false identifica- 
tion and iinmigration documents.17 However, after a former room- 
mate, Youseff Hmimssa, agreed to cooperate, the defendants were 
charged in a superseding indictment with conspiring to provide mate- 
rial support and resources to terrorism.ls 
The prosecution's case at trial was premised on the theory that 
the defendants operated a "sleeper cell" that was set up to provide 
covert, underground support for terrorist attacks inside and outside 
the United States. The prosecution alleged in its opening statement 
that the defendants were a "shadowy group" of Islamic fundamental- 
ists connected to various international terrorist organizations who 
"stayed in the weeds" and were "planning, seeking direction, awaiting 
the call."19 A key prosecution witness-FBI supervisory agent Paul 
George-testified as a "summary expert" that the defendants were an 
operational terrorist unit that was "going to strike out against targets, 
against the United States and abroad."20 George based his conclusion 
on (1) his opinion that the sketches and videotape seized from the 
defendants' apartment constituted operational terrorist "casing mate- 
16. See id. at 6. (dcscribing the scarch of the apartment and denying the defendants' motion 
to suooress evidence seized Dursuant to the search warrant). 
f7: See United States < Koubriti, 199 F. Supp. 2d 656, 658 (E.D. Mich. 2002); 18 U.S.C. 
9s 1028(a)(6), 1546(a) (2000). 
18. See 18 U.S.C. §§  371,2339A (2000); Koubriti, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 419. Under the super- 
seding Indictment, a fourth defendant, Abdel Ilah El-Mardoudi, was also indicted as a co-con- 
spirakr. Koubriti. 252 F. Supp. at 419. "The first line of the government's indictment . . . 
amears to have been e o ~ i e d  without attribution from a scholarlv article on Islamic fundamental- 
. . 
ism." Danny Hakim & ~ r i c  Lichtblau, After Convictions, the (indoing of a U.S. Terror Prosecu- 
tion, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 7,2004, at Al. 
19. See Government Motion. supra note 15, at 10-11. The superseding indictment undcr 
which the defendants were tried alleged that the defendants "operated as a covert underground 
support unit for terrorist attacks within and outside the United Stales. as well as a 'sleeper' 
operational combat cell." Id. at 11 (citation omitted). Assistant United States Attorney Richard 
Convertino was the lead prosecutor at the trial. 
20. Id. at 11 (citing 25 Tr. 4653). 
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rial" used for surveillance for planned terrorist attacks; (2) the defend- 
ants' acquisition of fraudulent identity documents and their 
involvement in other fraudulent activities; and (3) the testimony of 
H r n i m s ~ a . ~ ~  
B. Alleged "Casing" Sketches and "Surveillance" Videotape 
The sketches and videotape were critical to George's opinion. In 
the absence of direct proof regarding the origin, purpose, or intended 
use of the sketches, the prosecution relied on the testimony of 
George. He asserted that possession of these materials "clearly 
showed this [apartment was] a repository of intelligence" containing 
"operational terrorist material."22 His opinion that the Jordan and 
Turkey drawings constituted "casing material" was based on three 
considerations. First, the drawings "looked like [they] depicted some- 
thing that could exist"; second, the sketches were in fact "consistent 
with a place in the real world"; and third, the sketch locations were 
"possible [terror] targets."23 
1. Jordan "Hospital" Sketch 
According to George, the sketch bearing the label "Queen Alia, 
Jordan" was a "casing sketch" because "it ha[d] all the markings one 
would need and ha[d] a location."24 In reaching this conclusion, 
George relied on the testimony of two other witnesses-FBI agent 
Michael Thomas and State Department employee Ray Smith. 
Thomas testified that he traveled to Jordan, that he showed the sketch 
to members of the Jordanian Intelligence Service, and that they be- 
21. Id. (citing 25 Tr. 4635). George characterized the defendants' acquisition of fraudulent 
documents and involvement in fraudulent activities as "economic Jihad." Id. (quoting 25 Tr. 
4635). George opined that possession of fraudulent documents was consistent with "the purpose 
of bringing in other members." Id. at 11-12. He further testified that the defendants' attempts 
to obtain driver's licenses were "consistent with the transportation needs of a terrorist cell," and 
attempts to obtain hazardous material specifications were "consistent with a list of things a ter- 
ror cell seeks to establish." Id. at 12. 
22. Id at 11 (quoting 25 Tr. 4635). George further explained that examination of this "cas- 
ing material" shows that "this is an intelligence group, an intelligence cell whose purpose is to 
maintain potential targets, to maintain intelligence casing material." Id. (quoting 25 Tr. 4630). 
George claimed that international wire transfers as evidenced in this case are "the hallmark of 
an international terrorist organization," and that the ability of the defendants through credit 
card schemes "to connect two people who can communicate freely on the telephone or in code 
as it is called for by in some of the terrorist manuals is remarkable." Id. at 12 (quoting 25 Tr. 
4632). 
23. Id. at  15-16 (quoting 25 Tr. 4538-39). George reached his opinion that the sketches were 
operational terrorist casing sketches based entirely on his three-part formula without reference 
to any other evidence. Id. at 15 (citing 26 Tr. 4697). George testified that although the drawings 
might look crude, "it is imperative to keep things simple because any unnecessary marks confuse 
the mind with too much detail." Id. (quoting 25 Tr. 4539). The sketches, he further observed, 
"were examples of a situation where minimal details are recorded on an as-needed basis because 
everything the operator does is in preparation for the possibility of arrest." Id. (quoting 25 Tr. 
4535). 
24. Id. at 16 (quoting 25 Tr. 4540). 
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lieved the sketch was of the Queen Alia Military H o ~ p i t a l . ~ ~  Thomas 
testified that he went to the hospital, and he identified for the jury 
several objects in the sketch that he claimed corresponded to what he 
saw, including a "very large dead tree."26 According to George, the 
presence of the dead tree provided "certainty" that the sketch was a 
casing drawing.Z7 The prosecution did not introduce any photographs 
to reinforce Thomas' testimony. 
"Smith testified that he had traveled with Thomas and two 
Jordanian agents to the . . . Queen Alia Military Hospital," and that 
the Jordan sketch accurately represented the hospital, most convinc- 
ingly because of the "'prominent' dead tree standing by the side of the 
road."28 Smith also had an opportunity to do an overhead flight over 
the location. He testified that there was "no doubt in my mind I had 
sufficient information to believe that this sketch was similar to the 
Queen Alia Military Hospital, by just doing the on-the-ground work. 
But doing the fly-over reinforced that a great dea1."29 Smith further 
testified that based on his experience "as a security officer, if I were to 
see this sketch and I worked at that hospital, I'd be very concerned 
[that] this was part of some bigger plan."30 No photographs were 
taken of the site, Smith emphasized, because "diplomats serving over- 
seas . . . never take picture[s] of a military in~tal lat ion."~~ 
- ~~ 
25. Id. (citing 8 Tr. 1131-35). Thomas testified that officials in the Jordanian Intelligence 
Service noted that there are three locations in Jordan that bear the designation "Queen Alia" in 
their name-the Queen Alia Airport, the Queen Alia Hotel and the Queen Alia Military Hospi- 
tal. Id. (citing 8 Tr. 1131-35). 
26. Id. at 17 (quoting 8 Tr. 1131-34). At the request of the court, Thomas described in 
"step-by-step detail" the route he traveled to reach the hospital and what he did and saw. He 
testified there was "a largc, dead tree with no leaves, only branches, and also identified a 'very 
sharp turn' that was 'exactly consistent"' with the way it was drawn on the sketch. Id. (quoting 8 
Tr. 1138). 
27. Id. at 20. (citing 11 Tr. 4540-41). According to Thomas, he was "certain" that the draw- 
ing was a casing sketch because "it ha[d] a clearly defined set of markings" that "tells me that 
when I get there, I'm in the right place." Id. (quoting 11 Tr. 4540-41). If one puts oneself "in the 
shoes of the [terrorist] operator. . . you need certainty. That mark there is that certainty." Id. 
(quoting 11 Tr. 4540-41). Indeed, according to Thomas, "a tree does better than does North, 
South, any other thing, any other description." Id. (quoting 11 Tr. 4540-11). 
28. Id. at 18 (quoting 11 Tr. 1770-87). Smith noted that the group first traveled to the 
Queen Alia Airport and Queen Alia Hotel but the group "quickly concluded that those loca- 
tions did not match the sketch." Id. (quoting 11 Tr. 1770-87). 
29. Id. at 19 (quoting 11 Tr. 1787). Smith was extremely confident of his conclusion, testify- 
ing that as he gave the hospital area a closer inspection, "every time we turned, it was getting 
more and more like this drawing." Id. (quoting 11 Tr. 1780). 
30. Id. (quoting 11 Tr. 1783-84). 
31. Id. at 19-20 (quoting 11 Tr. 1785-86). In response to questions from the court and the 
defense, the prosecutor stated that he did not intend to introduce any photographs of the hospi- 
tal site. Id. at 18. Smith was specifically asked by the prosecutor, and the defense on cross- 
examination, whether he took photographs of thc hospital site. Id. at 20 (citing 11 Tr. 1797- 
1811). He maintained that "he did not believe he could have obtained photographs." Id. (quot- 
ing 11 Tr. 1797-1811). "Neither Smith nor Thomas mentioned that [the trial prosecutor] had also 
traveled to Jordan and accompanied them on their site visits." Id. at 18 n.7 (citing 8 Tr. 1132,ll 
Tr. 1771). 
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2. "Turkish Air Base" Sketch 
The prosecution sought to prove that the second sketch, labeled 
"American Base in Turkey Under Command of Secretary of Defense 
for All Weapons," was a "casing sketch" of the Incirlik Air Base in 
Turkey.32 Asked to explain the importance of this sketch, FBI Agent 
George testified that "[ilt gives all the information one would need to 
conduct a terrorist attack."33 George's conclusion was based on the 
testimony of FBI Agent Thomas as well as Air Force Colonel Mary 
Peterson. Thomas testified that he met with Turkish intelligence offi- 
cials and United States Special Investigation Air Force officers; they 
viewed the Incirlik base from the vantage point from which they be- 
lieved the sketch had been drawn. He testified that "what he ob- 
served was 'almost identical' to the drawing."34 
Colonel Peterson testified that although "there were 'important 
differences' between the actual base and the drawing,"35 "it was ap- 
parent to [him] upon seeing it, that [the sketch depicted] air field op- 
erations."36 The sketch was a "starting or preoperational 
surveillance" of the air base.37 Unlike the alleged hospital sketch, to 
support Peterson's opinion the prosecution introduced into evidence 
photographs of the airbase, the air shelter, and planes flying over the 
base.38 
32. Id. at 25-26 (quoting 7 Tr. 1016-17). The prosecutor in his opening statement told the 
jury that it would hear testimony that the sketch was a "casing picture of the United States base 
in Incirlik, Turkey, the airbase that does Northern Watch over Iraq." Id. at 26 (quoting 7 TI. 
1016-17). The prosecutor further asserted that a military colonel assigned to the base would 
testify to "where that sketch was drawn from." that the sketch "depicted on the page, are the 
very flight pattern as the planes take off every single time at Incirlik" and will identify at the 
bottom of the page a "harden bunker." Id. at 26 (quoting 7 Tr. 1016-17). 
33. Id. (quoting 25 Tr. 4540). George elaborated that the sketch "may look crude, but the 
hallmark of an operational plan, whether it's a casing sketch or it's how the plan is carried out, is 
simplicity." Id. (quoting 25 Tr. 4539). 
34. Id. at  27 (quoting 8 Tr. 1143-44). Thomas testified that he observed "a runway down the 
center of the air base and AWACs, tankers and fighter jets lined on the tarmac in a format that 
resembled the drawing." Id. (quoting 8 Tr. 1150). He also observed a "hardened aircraft shelter 
. . . that he said resembled the object drawn on the lower left side of the sketch." Id. (quoting 8 
Tr. 1145-46). Thomas further testified that three circular objects on the drawing resembled 
"three circular looking antennas." Id. (quoting 8 Tr. 1147-48). 
35. Id. at 28 11.13 (quoting 13 Tr. 2225-27). "She described the sketch as not a 'single draw- 
ing, but a series of depictions."' Id. (quoting 13 Tr. 2225-27). 
36. Id. at 27 (quoting 13 Tr. 2225). She testified that thc drawing "apparently depicted 
AWACs, refueling airplanes and fighters," and that these planes, all of which were involved in 
Operation Northern Watch. "were shown in the actual takeoff sequence, and that the drawing in 
the lower left-hand portion resembled a hardened air shelter." Id. at 26-27 (quoting 8 TI. 1141). 
37. Id. at 28 (quoting 13 Tr. 2243). She also offered her strong belief that slash marks on 
the drawing "could be field of fire from shoulder launched missiles." Id. (quoting 13 Tr. 2245- 
46). 
38. Id. (citing 11 Tr. 2228-32, 2239-41). The prosecution sought to bolster Peterson's testi- 
mony by eliciting from her that she showed the drawing to several officials who were more 
familiar with the base than she was, including the Security Police Commander, all of whom 
concurred in her assessment. Id. at 29. "Peterson also testified that senior officers with over- 
sight flight [responsibilities] at the [Incirlik base] modified flight arrival and departure protocols 
after viewing the drawing." Id. at 29 11.15 (quoting 13 Tr. 2243-44). 
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3. "Surveillance" Videotape 
In addition to the sketches, the government sought to prove that 
a videotape in Arabic found in the defendants' apartment was a ter- 
rorist "casing" video. The video showed shots of the MGM Grand 
Hotel in Las Vegas, Disneyland, as well as various sites in New York. 
George offered his "very strong opinion" that the videotape consti- 
tuted "operational terrorist material."39 After describing a Disney- 
land sequence that showed the underground line to the Raiders of the 
Lost Ark ride, George testified that the tape contained "all the infor- 
mation . . . that is needed to conduct a terrorist attack at that line."40 
A government translator also testified that language on the tape con- 
tained a direct threat and derogatory remarks about the United 
 state^.^' 
C. Testimony of Turncoat Witness Youseff Hmimssa 
Youseff Hmimssa was the only witness for the prosecution who 
claimed to have direct knowledge that the defendants were involved 
in terrorist activities.42 Hmimssa, a Moroccan native, was a fugitive 
when he met the defendants and moved in with them.43 He testified 
that the defendants were Islamic fundamentalists who lauded ter- 
39. Id. at 38 (quoting 25 Tr. 4629). "The tape, which originally contained a commercial 
movie . . . had been recorded over with various material, including TV news, a cartoon, a Leba- 
ncsc singer, as well as scenes from the trip." Id .  at 37 (quoting 8 Tr. 1121). 
40. Id. at 38 (quoting 25 Tr. 4593). George noted the existence of a garbage can at the end 
of the line. "[He] testified that the garbage can was an 'ideal location' for a bomb, and claimed 
that after this sequence a voice said 'this is a grave yard."' Id .  (quoting 25 Tr. 4593, 4589). 
41. Id. (citing 31 Tr. 5773-74). "The defendants argued that the videotape was simply a 
tourist tape depicting . . . young Tunsiians visiting notable [U.S.] attractions." Id. The defense 
also claimed that the language on the tape contained a mix of Classical Arabic and Tunisian 
dialect, and that "the government translators mistranslated critical portions of the videotape 
because they had difficulty understanding Tunisian, o r  any of the closely related North African 
dialects. . . ." Id.  (quoting Tr. 5754). The government expert testified that he had no difficulty 
deciphering the tape, understanding it, and writing it down. Id. at 39 11.23 (citing 31 Tr. 5769). 
The prosecutor attempted to bolster the government's translation and discredit the opinion of 
the defense translator by asking her "whether it would change her opinion to learn that six other 
translators had independently reviewed the portion of the tape in question and had agreed with 
the government's translation." Id. at 38-39 (quoting 31 Tr. 5757-58). The prosecutor also at- 
tempted to discredit thc defensc claim by suggesting that "there is little or no difference between 
Classical Arabic and the Tunisian dialect,'' and that any differcnccs resemble "regional or state- 
by-state differences in the English language . . . ." Id. at 39 (quoting 31 Tr. 5779-80). 
42. Id. at 42. Another witness, James Sanders, gave far more limited testimony. Id .  at  42 
11.25. 
43. Id. at 42-43. Hmimssa was originally indicted on September 27, 2001, along with de- 
fendants Koubriti and Hannan, charged with document fraud and misuse of visas. United States 
v. Koubriti, 199 F. Supp. 2d 656, 658 (E.D. Mich. 2002). On March 22, 2002, the court granted 
his motion for a scvcrance. See Koubriti, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 658 n.1. Hmimssa "entered the U.S. 
illegally in 1994" and acquired computer skills "to execute a large scale credit card fraud." Gov- 
ernment Motion, supra note 15, at 42. He was eventually "arrested by the Secret Service, agreed 
to cooperate, and then fled to Detroit where he met and moved in with defendants Koubriti and 
Hannan." Id .  
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rorists and engaged in various terrorist-related a ~ t i v i t i e s . ~ ~  According 
to Hmimssa, the defendants 
conducted surveillance of potential terrorist targets in Detroit, at- 
tended mysterious meetings with unknown persons, . . . discussed 
various terrorist plots such as poisoning food on airplanes and 
shooting down commercial airplanes with Stinger missiles[,] . . . es- 
tablished methods to communicate internationally [without being 
traced,] attempted to obtain false identifications, money, and weap- 
ons to assist 'brothers' overseas, . . . conducted wire transfers with 
extremist brothers overseas[,] . . . and threatened to kill Hmimssa if 
he [turned out] to be an informant . . . .45 
"Throughout his testimony, Hmimssa portrayed himself as secular, 
loyal to the United States," and entirely truthful.46 
D. "Corroborating" Evidence 
The prosecution offered allegedly corroborating evidence to es- 
tablish that the defendants engaged in conduct that was consistent 
with terrorist activitie~.~' For example, the prosecution introduced ap- 
proximately 105 audio tape recordings seized from the Detroit apart- 
ment, which, according to government experts, contained 
fundamentalist Islamic tea~hings.~8 In addition, the government intro- 
duced evidence that defendant Hannan, in a post-arrest statement to 
the FBI, acknowledged that he knew that certain documents found in 
the Detroit apartment were false.49 
The prosecution also introduced evidence intended to rebut a 
principal contention by the defense, namely, that the sketches and no- 
44. Id. at 43 (citing 15 Tr. 2476-94, 2497-510; 16 Tr. 2567-73, 2577-85). Hmimssa testified 
that the defendants "praised terrorists such as Sheik Omar Rahman and Osama Bin Laden, and 
criticized pro-U.S. Arab leaders in Saudi Arabia and Jordan." Id. (quoting 15 TI. 2476-94, 2497- 
. - 
510; 16 TI. 2567-73, 2577-85). - 
45. Id. (auotine 15 Tr. 2469-75: 16 Tr. 2566-67: 15 Tr. 2517-19: 16 TI. 2573-77; 15 Tr. 2519-23; 
16 Tr. 2555%; 15 5. 2494-2500 5616-17; 16 TI. 2546-50, 2557-58; 2561-64; 16 Tr. 2558-61.). 
46. Id. at 43-44. "Hmimssa was cross-examined for three days." Id. at 43. The questioning 
probed his extensive career as a criminal, "his incentive to assist the government," and his failure 
to allege in earlier government debriefings "that the defendants were terrorists." Id. 
47. Id. at 50. As part of his tradecraft analysis, Agent George was asked to give his expert 
opinion on the significance of this alleged corroborating evidence. Id. at 50 n.32. 
48. Id. at 50. Given the shortage of government Arabic language specialists, the prosecu- 
tion employed a cooperating witness, Marwan Farhat, to translate the tapes. Id. Farhat had a 
"history of violence and drug related criminal convictions" and was involved with individuals 
associated with the terrorist group Hizballah. Id. Farhat was awaiting trial on federal cocaine 
charges. Id. at 51-52. "In return for his work, Farhat was paid by the FBI and . . . received an 
unusually large sentence reduction" upon the recommendation of the trial prosecutor. Id. at 51. 
The prosecution's employment of Farhat was not disclosed to the defense. Id. Farhat's identity 
was leaked to the media on January 17, 2004, and he fled the country within five days. United 
States v. Koubriti, 307 F. Supp. 2d 891, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The court criticized the disclo- 
sures of confidential information to the media. Id. at 894-95. The problem of making accurate 
translations of Arabic tapes still persists and has not been effectively remedied. Eric Lichtblau, 
F.B.I. Said to Lag on Translations of Terror Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at Al .  
49. See Government Motion, supru note 15, at 52. The government's memorandum sug- 
gests that this incriminating passage may have been added to the FBI report at the request of the 
trial prosecutor. The FBI's original interview notes of the interrogation of Hannan "do not 
reflect Hannan's admission." Id. 
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tations were doodles made by Ali Ahmed, "a mentally unstable 
Yemeni man" who had previously occupied the Detroit apartment.*O 
The defense argued that Ali Ahmed "had delusions [of] being a Gen- 
eral in the Yemeni Army[,]" had drawn the sketches, and had left 
them in the apartment where they were found by the  defendant^.^' 
"The prosecution [argued] that the defendants used Ali Ahmed as a 
dupe to provide 'cover' for their terrorist" operations and induced 
him to pretend that the sketches were his.52 Although no witnesses 
"recalled [ever] seeing Ali Ahmed in the company of the defend- 
ants,"53 the prosecution called a witness, Carolyn Fuhr Sadowski, a 
Sam's Club employee, who identified defendant Koubriti as having 
accompanied Ali Ahmed to Sam's Club in January 2001 when the two 
purchased over three thousand dollars' worth of cigarettes using a bad 
The defense contended that Sadowski was mistaken, and that 
the person accompanying Ali Ahmed was Thamir Zaia, whose driver's 
license had been presented by the two as identification.55 Apparently, 
Sadowski was a convincing witness, for as the trial judge observed, 
"[She was] certain. She didn't hesitate, she looked at everybody and 
she picked out Mr. K o ~ b r i t i . " ~ ~  
E. Prosecutor's Portrayal of the Evidence 
Both in his opening statement and his summation, the prosecutor 
portrayed the defendants as a "sleeper operational combat cell" wait- 
ing for the opportune moment to attack targets both within and 
outside the United States. The prosecutor's opening remarks, for ex- 
ample, claimed that the defendants were a "'shadowy group' that 
'stayed in the weeds' [and were] 'planning, seeking direction, awaiting 
the ~a11."'5~ The prosecutor's closing argument tracked the same 
50. Id. at 53. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. The prosecution also introduced testimony from the landlord's son that everything 
in the apartment had been discarded prior to the defendants' rental. Id. at 53 n.33. 
53. Id. at 53. "AU Ahmed committed suicide in March 2001" before Koubriti and Hannan 
moved into the apartment. Id. 
54. Id. Sadowski identified Koubriti from photographs as the man who accompanied Ah- 
med at Sam's Club. Id. at 54. "Although Koubriti was working [on] a chicken farm in Ohio in 
January 2001," the prosecution proved "that hc was not at work on the date in question." Id. 
55. Id. at 53-54. Zaia had a prior conviction for smuggling cigarettes and apparently ac- 
knowledged several times to government agents that he was with Ahmed at Sam's Club on the 
date in question. Id. at 54. On  advice of counsel, Zaia refused to testify. Id. 
56. Id. (quoting 21 Tr. 3927). As the government's memorandum suggests, events since the 
trial indicate that it was indeed Zaia who was with Ahmed. See id. at 54-55. Although Zaia 
"gave a handwriting sample that closely matched the writing on the bad check, he failed a poly- 
graph examination [when he was] asked whether he was with Ali Ahmed and whether Koubriti 
was not present." Id. at 55. Moreover, a former CIA official, William McNair, challenged the 
prosecution's theory that the defendants had used Ali Ahmed as a decoy as "inconsistent with 
conventional tradecraft analysis." Id. at 55-56. This information was not disclosed to the de- 
fense. Id. at 56. 
57. Id. at 10-11 (quoting 8 Tr. 1023-24 (opening statements)). 
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theme in more detail, arguing that the defendants were a "dangerous, 
. . . pre-operational cell" that probably would have been successful 
had they not been intercepted by law e n f o r ~ e m e n t . ~ ~  The prosecutor 
reminded the jury that the "cell . . . was stopped[, the] cell . . . was 
caught[, the] cell . . . cannot operate"; the prosecutor urged that "these 
people belong in prison," adding, "[d]on7t give these people another 
chance to make their plan effective."Sg Reinforcing the potentially 
catastrophic consequences of the defendant's terrorist activities, the 
prosecutor argued: 
You know the defense is represented by those attorneys. We re- 
present people too. The mother and father in the ride in the Dis- 
neyworld underground. The soldier in Incirlik, Turkey, who takes a 
plane off, sitting on $500,000 worth of-500,000 gallons worth of 
fuel. The people in Amman, Jordan from the United States Em- 
bassy who go to that hospital. The people in Las Vegas in the lob- 
bies of hotels. The person driving his car down Pacific Coast 
Highway or the person walking into the New York Times Building, 
thinking it's just another day. People here in Dearborn, Michigan 
and all parts of Michigan, people who think they're safe, who don't 
think about anything other than getting home to their families. 
Those are the people we represent as 
111. How THE JURY'S SEARCH FOR TRUTH WAS CORRUPTED 
The jury deliberated for seven days and returned a split verdict. 
It found defendants Koubriti and El Mardoudi guilty of conspiring to 
provide material support and resources to terrorism. It acquitted de- 
fendant Hannan of these charges, but found him guilty of document 
fraud conspiracy. It found defendant Ali-Haimoud not guilty of all 
charges.61 
The defendants moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, 
alleging a "pervasive pattern of outrageous misconduct [that] de- 
prived them of a fair trial and violated the very integrity of the judicial 
sy~tern."6~ The defendants made specific allegations that the Govern- 
ment knowingly used false testimony, suppressed critical evidence, in- 
terfered with access to witnesses, and improperly vouched for and 
bolstered the testimony of witnesses.63 The trial judge held a hearing 
58. Id. at 57 (quoting closing argument). 
59. Id. (quoting closing argument Tr. 71-72). 
60. Id. at 57-58 (quoting Tr. 71-72). 
61. Id. at 1-2. 
62. Motion for Judgment in Favor of the Defendants Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the 
Alternative, For a New Trial, With Request for an Evidentiary Hearing, United States v. 
Koubriti et al., No. 01-80778 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17> 2003), at 2 (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Defendants' Motion]. 
63. Id. Before the trial began, "the government deported at least two witnesses who chal- 
lenged the prosecution's case." Norman Sinclair, Ronald J. Hansen, & David Shepardson, Fed 
Missteps Jeopardize Terror Case; Federal Review Finds Government Ignored Own Rules, With- 
held More Than 100 Documents from Defense, DETROIT NEWS, March 28, 2004, at 1A. 
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on the motion on December 12, 2003. During that hearing the judge 
discovered that the prosecution had possessed two documents that 
"clearly" contained exculpatory and impeachment material, and there 
was "no question7' that the documents should have been disclosed to 
the defense.64 The court reserved decision on the defendants' motion, 
and ordered the Government to conduct a thorough review of every 
document in the case to determine whether there were additional doc- 
uments that should have been disclosed. 
Following a nine-month review, the Government filed a memo- 
randum dated August 31, 2004, conceding that the convictions were 
flawed and describing in considerable detail how the jury's determina- 
tion was impaired by the misconduct of the prosecution.65 According 
to the Government's memorandum, 
In its best light, the record would show that the prosecution com- 
mitted a pattern of mistakes and oversights that deprived the de- 
fendants of discoverable evidence (including impeachment 
material) and created a record filled with misleading inferences that 
such material did not exist. Accordingly, the government believes 
that it should not prolong the resolution of this matter pursuing 
hearings it has no reasonable prospect of winning.(j6 
The Government requested that the defendants be given a new trial 
on the charges dealing with document fraud, and that the count charg- 
ing them with conspiracy to engage in terrorist activities be dismissed. 
The judge granted the Government's motion.67 
As described below, the Government's memorandum offers an 
extraordinary insight into how a jury can reach the wrong result not 
from any defects intrinsic to the jury's decision-making competence 
but for extrinsic reasons that relate to the nature of the evidence and 
the manner in which it is presented. The Government's memorandum 
described in meticulous detail how the jury received false, misleading, 
incomplete, and prejudicial information, including the prosecution's 
suppression of exculpatory and impeachment evidence, allowing wit- 
64. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 44-45 (citing 121203 TR 167). One of these 
documents was a letter from Milton "Butch" Jones regarding jail housc communications with 
Youseff Hmimssa. See id.  at 44; see also infra notes 113-115 and accompanying text. 
65. See Government Motion, supra note 15. 
66. Id. at 5. From the beginning, even accepting the reliability of the proof, senior officials 
in the Justice Department expressed serious doubts about the strength of the case. See Danny 
Hakim & Eric Lichtblau, After Convictions, the Undoing of a U.S. Terror Prosecution, N . Y .  
TIMES,  Oct. 7,2004, at A1 (stating that officials had described the case's "chance of success" as a 
"close call," and the evidence as "somewhat weak"). 
67. See Unitcd States v. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
As the Government's filing also makes clear, these failures by the prosecution were not 
sporadic or isolated. Rather, they were of such a magnitude, and were so prevalent and 
pervasive as to constitute a pattern of conduct, that when all of the withheld evidence is 
viewed collectively, it is an inescapable conclusion that the Defendants' due process, 
confrontation and fair trial rights were violated and that the jury's verdict was infected 
to the point that the Court believes there is at least a reasonable probability that the 
jury's verdict would have been different had constitutional standards been met. 
Id. at 681. 
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nesses to give false and misleading, and unreliable, testimony, misus- 
ing experts, coaching witnesses, obstructing cross-examination, and 
making inflammatory arguments to the jury. 
, 
A. Suppression of Evidence 
One of the techniques employed by prosecutors to obstruct accu- 
rate fact-finding is to conceal exculpatory evidence from the jury that 
has the potential to materially affect the fact-finding process and the 
suppression of which seriously impedes the jury's search for the 
Indeed, the prosecutor's suppression of evidence that would 
be materially favorable to the defense is one of the major causes of 
erroneous  conviction^.^^ Given his superior investigative resources 
and early access to evidence of criminal wrongdoing, a prosecutor has 
a unique ability to acquire evidence that may contradict the prosecu- 
tor's theory of the case. To the extent a prosecutor has exclusive 
knowledge and control of such evidence, the prosecutor has a consti- 
tutional and ethical duty to disclose such information to the defense.70 
By failing to disclose potentially truth-enhancing evidence as well as 
obstructing defense access to potentially truth-enhancing evidence, a 
prosecutor violates his constitutional and ethical duty and impedes the 
jury's ability to find the t r ~ t h . 7 ~  
As the Government's memorandum acknowledged, the prosecu- 
tor concealed from the court, the defense, and the jury evidence that 
would have altered the jury's evaluation of the case, the suppression 
of which arguably produced an erroneous decision. The suppressed 
evidence probably would have altered the jury's conclusion that the 
sketches and the videotape were prepared by the defendants to fur- 
ther a terrorist plot. 
68. See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN,  PROSECIJTORIAL MISCONDUCT $ 5  5:l-5:24 (2d ed. 2003). 
69. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially 
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21,23,57 (1987) (asserting that fifty of the 350 wrongful convic- 
tions resulted from prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence or other overzealous pros- 
ecution); Marty Rosenbaum, lnevitable Error: Wrongful New York State Homicide Convictions, 
1965-1988, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 807, 809 (1991) ("[A] substantial number of the 
wrongful convictions we have found in New York resulted from prosecutorial misconduct."); 
Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at C1 
(claiming 381 homicide cases were reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence suggesting 
defendants' innocence or presented evidence known to be false). 
70. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[S]uppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is mate- 
rial either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."). 
71. The search for truth is generally regarded as the touchstone for the adversary system. 
See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,681 (1986) ("[Tlhe central purpose of a criminal trial 
is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence."); Tom Stacy, The Search 
for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (1991) ("The 
theme of accurate adjudication lies at the very heart of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' vision 
of constitutional criminal procedure."); Thomas L. Steffen. Truth as Second Fiddle: Reevaluating 
the Place of Truth in the Adversarial Trial Ensemble, 4 UTAH L. REV. 799, 804 (1988) ("Simply 
stated, truth is the sine qua non of justice. If justice is to have meaning beyond that of a hollow 
shibboleth, it must reflect a wise and fair application of truth."). 
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1. Jordan "Hospital" Sketch 
Undisclosed evidence suggests that the Jordan sketch, which, ac- 
cording to several Government witnesses depicted the Queen Alia 
Hospital,72 did not in fact represent the hospital. The prosecution's 
insistence notwithstanding, the Government's memorandum stated: 
"It is difficult if not impossible to compare the day planner sketches 
with the photos and see a correlation between the drawings and the 
hospital site."73 Undisclosed e-mails and photographs from the State 
Department indicate that the testimony of prosecution witness Ray 
Smith, the State Department employee who claimed that the sketch 
positively matched the hospital and that it was not possible to take 
photographs, was ~ n t r u t h f u l . ~ ~  Contrary to the testimony of Govern- 
ment witnesses, photographs of the hospital not only could have been 
taken, but were in fact taken at the prosecution's request.75 The Gov- 
ernment's memorandum stated that the suppression of this evidence 
"misled" the jury by creating the "false impression" first, that there 
was consensus that the drawing depicted the h0spital,7~ and second, 
that "photos could not be taken due to diplomatic red tape."77 
Additional undisclosed evidence would have proved that after 
Smith's trip to Jordan, he advised his superiors that he visited both the 
hospital and the airport, and that after looking at the sketch, he could 
not establish what the sketch referred Indeed, a draft prosecu- 
tion memorandum prepared after Smith's Jordan trip referred to the 
sketch as depicting not the hospital but the airport.79 
Moreover, the prosecution concealed from the jury that the 
Jordanians initially believed that the sketch depicted the Queen Alia 
Airport and not the hospital and misled the jury into believing that 
the Jordanians focused on the hospital from the start.80 According to 
- - p~ 
72. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. 
73. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 23. 
74. Id. at 22-23. These e-mails show (1) after visiting the hospital and the airport, Smith 
"could not establish which site (if either) the sketch referred to," (2) there was "no problem 
obtaining permission to take aerial photographs," and (3) despite repeated requests, none of the 
persons who were assigned to take photos of the hospital site could locate the "large dead tree." 
Id. at 21, 22 n.9, 21-22. Agent George reinforced Smith's claim, emphasizing in his testimony 
that "photographs could not be taken." Id. at 23 (quoting 26 Tr. 4843). 
75. Id. at 20-22. E-mails state that "at AUSA Convertino's request, he had obtained and 
given to SA Thomas a series of aerial and ground photos of the Queen Alia Hospital." Id. at  21. 
George's testimony reinforced Smith's assertion that diplomatic red tape prevented him from 
taking photographs of the hospital. Id. at 23. In his testimony, George stated, "I leave that 
discretion entirely to him. So if he tells me he felt that taking photographs would, in any way, 
impact on his ability to do his primary mission, sir, I leave that entirely to him." Id. (quoting 26 
Tr. 46621. 
76.-'Id. at  22-23. 
77. Id. at 23. 
78. Id. at 21. 
79. Id. at 21 n.8. 
80. Id. at 24 n.11. Thomas stated to the Public Integrity investigators during the post-trial 
inquiry "that the Jordanians initially believed that the sketch was of the Queen Alia Airport and 
not the hospital," but Thomas did not reveal, this to the jury during his testimony. Id. 
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Thomas' testimony: "We presented [the sketch] to the Jordanians. 
They said we believe this is the military hospital." Smith sidestepped 
the question, asked on direct examination, as to why he went to the 
airport first by responding that "'one of the reasons' they went [to the 
airport] was because it had 'Queen Alia' in its name." He failed to 
answer why they visited the airport first.81 Smith again gave a mis- 
leading answer "when asked on cross-examination whether the airport 
was the Jordanians first [opinion] upon looking at the sketch," sug- 
gesting again that the only reason they went to the airport was be- 
cause it had the name "Queen Alia."s2 
Further, several undisclosed e-mails contained a series of aerial 
photographs of the hospital and the road networks leading to the hos- 
pital. Although the State Department requested photographs of the 
hospital, particularly of the "large dead tree," which was urged by the 
prosecution to constitute such a prominent landmark, neither Smith 
nor his associates could locate the tree.83 Following the prosecutor's 
request that additional photographs be taken to locate the tree, a new 
set of photographs was taken of the hospital with more specific direc- 
tions as to where the tree might be located. All of the photographs 
were forwarded to the prosecutor. Nevertheless, through the testi- 
mony of Smith and FBI Agent George, the jury was informed that 
"photographs could not be taken."S4 Finally, the above sets of photos 
mysteriously "disappeared" after the 
2. "Turkish Air Base7' Sketch 
Undisclosed evidence also contradicts the prosecution's conten- 
tion that the sketch labeled "American Base in Turkey Under Com- 
mands of Secretary of Defense for All Weapons" was a "casing 
sketch" of the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. The prosecution witnesses 
conveyed the impression, shown to be false, that government officials 
were unanimous.86 An undisclosed internal report by an Air Force 
investigator alleged that the Government's assertion at trial that the 
hardened air shelter (HAS) at the base was "almost identical" to the 
drawing, and that the dark parallel lines and human-like figures on the 
81. Id. 
82. Id.  (quoting 11 Tr. 1805). 
83. Id .  at 21-22. 
84. Id. at 23 (quoting 26 Tr. 4843). 
85. Id.  at 25 11.12. Although Thomas was given two different sets of photos of the hospital 
site: Thomas "failed to enter the photos into the FBI's . . . files." Id. "Thomas claimed he 
planned to enter the photos into the FBI evidence filc digitally," but was never given the appro- 
priate disk. Id .  Thomas claimed he last saw the photos in the "trial preparation room" and 
speculated that a paralegal "may have thrown them away after trial." I d .  As the government's 
memorandum states, "The disappearance of these photos that the prosecution team sought so 
diligently to acquire would be difficult for the government to explain at a new trial hearing." Id.  
86. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. According to the Government's memo- 
randum, this impression was "inaccurate." Government Motion, supra note 15, at 33. 
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sketch that allegedly represent fields of fire, were "highly specula- 
tive."S7 The Air Force report asserted that these speculative portions 
of the sketch were "sold" to the prosecution as facts. The Air Force 
report also asserted that the prosecutor "believe[d] strongly in the 
HAS theory and want[ed] someone from [the Air Force] to testify that 
the drawing [was] in fact a HAS."8s 
Moreover, after closely examining the Turkey sketch, Air Force 
investigators had formed an alternative theory that the figure on the 
lower left portion of the drawing was a map of the Middle East.89 
Colonel Peterson, the Government's principal witness that the sketch 
depicted the air base, did not disclose that others within the Air Force 
disagreed with her testimony,90 nor did she reveal that she was aware 
of the alternative "Middle East map" theory.Y1 The map theory had 
been relayed to the prosecutor, along with an innocent explanation of 
how it may have been created. The prosecutor replied "adamantly, 
'[ilt's not a map of the Middle East.'"92 
The prosecutor also suppressed evidence that intelligence offi- 
cials did not believe the sketches were connected to terrorist activities. 
After viewing the sketch, high-level intelligence officials employed by 
the Turkish National Police concluded "that the sketch did not look 
like any terrorist sketch they had [ever] seen in the past."93 In addi- 
tion, William McNair, a former Information Review Officer for the 
Director of Operations at the Central Intelligence Agency, had given 
the prosecutor prior to trial a "similarly negative [opinion] of the 
Turk[ish] air base sketch," suggesting that it was "what one would ex- 
pect from someone who was not very well-trained.7794 Moreover, after 
soliciting the opinions of various individuals in the CIA'S counter-ter- 
rorism and paramilitary center, McNair indicated that none of these 
officials believed that the sketch was "indicative of any particular 
87. Government Motion, supra note 15, at 28 n.13, 29. The report, prepared by Special 
Agent Goodnight, provided a detailed summary of his reasons for concluding that the sketch did 
not depict the Turkish air base, particularly the location and description of the air shelter. Id. at 
31. Goodnight specifically warned the prosecutor not to hang his hat on the theory that the 
sketch depicted the Turkish air base. Id. 
88. Id. at 30 (quoting ¶ 15 of Internal Addendum to March 26,2003 Air Force OSI Reporl). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 33. "Neither Peterson nor the prosecution advised either the defense or the Court 
of the Air Force's alternative theories." Id. at 32 n.18. 
91. Id. at 32 n.18 ("Peterson has since admitted to the Public Integrity investigators that she 
had seen the document (enlargement by Air Force officials of the lower left drawing) prior to 
trial but did not associate that with the defense's question of whether she had ever seen a 
blowup."). 
92. Id. at 33 ("Although Goodnight knew that the Air Force had developcd a Middle East 
map theory, Goodnight knew from Convertino's tone that the topic was not up for discussion 
and there was no further discussion of the topic."). 
93. Id. at 34-35. Although it is clear that the opinion of the Turkish intelligence officials was 
conveyed to the prosecution, this information was not disclosed to the defense and investigators 
did not find a c o ~ v  of the report in the FBI's files. Id. at 34 11.20. 
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group or country" or "conveyed any useful in f~rmat ion ."~~  According 
to McNair, the prosecutor "didn't much care what I was saying."96 It 
was McNair's belief that the prosecutor "was shopping for an opinion 
consistent with his own."97 
3. "Surveillance" Videotape 
The prosecutor also suppressed evidence that would have under- 
mined his asserted position that the videotape was "operational ter- 
rorist material." The prosecutor claimed that the videotape's 
depiction of sites in Las Vegas constituted evidence of surveillance in 
contemplation of terrorist acts.98 The prosecutor suppressed evidence 
from the Las Vegas FBI and the Las Vegas U.S. Attorney's Office that 
contradicted the prosecutor's claim, asserting instead that the video 
was not a surveillance tape but merely a tourist video.99 In fact, those 
agencies had specifically' asked the prosecutor to provide evidence as 
to why he considered the tape to be sur~eillance.10~ 
Moreover, contrary to the prosecutor's claim that the audio por- 
tion of the tape contained Arabic that was relatively easy to under- 
stand,lol the prosecutor was in possession of a government 
communication detailing the difficulty of translating the "audio por- 
tions of the videotape due to" the unusual Tunisian or Algerian dialect 
being spoken.lo2 According to the communication, Government 
95. I d .  McNair obtained opinions from the CIA'S Counter Terrorism Center, as well as 
document analysts at the CIA. and CIA "paramilitary people." Id. McNair "shared these opin- 
ions with AUSA Convertino over the course of approximately five to ten [telephone] conversa- 
tions," advising him that "it was the collective opinion of the people with whom he discussed the 
sketch that the sketch was not a very good work product." Id. at 36. 
96. Id. at 36. According to McNair, "Convertino was not really asking for the CIA'S opin- 
ion; he was stating that he thought the drawings were casing sketches of the Incirlik Airbase and 
insisting that his case rested on that assessment." Id. 
97. Id. (quoting McNair's Decl.). During the post-trial investigation, Convertino denied 
McNair's statements and alleged that McNair "is retaliating against Convertino out of spite." Id. 
at 36 n.21. Convertino has also urged that even if McNair did make the statements to Conver- 
tino (which other witnesses confirm that McNair did make), Convertino "would not have heard 
it because he believed McNair was incompetent and had tuned him out." Id. 
98. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
99. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 40. "According to an August 11, 2004 A P  
news article entitled Vegas Police Say They Saw Terror Tapes, a purported e-mail from Assistant 
United States Attorney Sharon Lever in Las Vegas to AUSA Convertino in the Fall of 2002 
stated: 'The FBI here has looked at the tape. Tbey said it is not a surveillance."' Id. at 40 n.24. 
Similarly, "several law enforcement officials in Las Vegas determined that the videotape repre- 
sented no threat to that city." Id. (referring to Steve Kanigher, Debate Over LV Terroricm Alle- 
gation Intensifies, LAS V E G A ~  SUN, Aug. 11, 2004, http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/ 
sun/2004/aug/11/517322092.html). According to sources, the tape 
looked like a tourist video . . . . It did not have the type of detail you would expect to 
see in a terrorist tape, such as entrances and exits, parking garages and underground 
facilities. If you wanted to get the information seen on that videotape, you could have 
gotten that much information and more on the internet. 
Id. at 40 n.24 (quoting Kanigher, supra). 
100. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 40. Neither of the Las Vegas assessments 
was furnished to the Court or defense counsel prior to trial. Id. 
101. See supra note 41. 
102. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 41. 
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Arabic language specialists "[had] further advised that the dialect of 
the individuals in the video [was] that of Tunisian or Algerian, [which 
made] it even more difficult to transcribe."lo3 Indeed, this was the 
same position advanced by the defendants at trial that the prosecutor 
challenged, namely, that the videotape was a tourist tape depicting a 
group of young Tunisians visiting notable United States attractions 
and containing language that was a mix of classical Arabic and a Tuni- 
sian dialect.lo4 The defense had claimed, apparently correctly, that 
the Government translators had mistranslated critical portions of the 
videotape.lo5 
B. Suborned Testimony 
A prosecutor's constitutional and ethical duty to disclose materi- 
ally favorable evidence to the defense includes the duty to ensure that 
his witnesses do not offer testimony that is false, misleading, or incom- 
plete.106 A prosecutor has a constitutional and ethical duty to correct 
such testimony so that the jury does not receive a false or misleading 
impression of the evidence.lo7 As with the suppression of evidence, 
prosecutors have the ability to corrupt the fact-finding process by ei- 
ther knowingly soliciting false or misleading testimony or allowing a 
witness to give false and misleading testimony without correcting it.Ios 
As noted above, the testimony of prosecution witnesses Ray 
Smith and Michael Thomas was at best misleading, and at worst un- 
truthful.109 But even more critical to the jury's determination was the 
testimony of Youseff Hmimssa. As the Government's memorandum 
acknowledged, the jury received false and misleading testimony from 
Hmimssa, who was the only witness who testified that the defendants 
were involved in terrorist activities.l10 Typically, the testimony of co- 
103. Id. The communication stated that it would "forward a copy of the tape to the FE3I . . . 
for enhancement, and locate a Language Specialist who is familiar with this specific Arabic dia- 
lect." Id. 
104. See supra note 41. 
105. See id.  at 41-42. The defense claim has been confirmed by information recently ob- 
tained by the FBI that the video was taken of a young Tunisian, his brother, and a number of 
other Tunisian students as part of a University social club touring the United States. Id. The 
young man's description of the tour and the innocent manner in which the video was produced 
has been "deemed credible" by the FBI agents who interviewed him. See id. 
106. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,112 (1935) ("[Dleliberate deception of court and 
jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured . . . is . . . inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of justice."). 
107. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 694 (2004) ("Farr repeatedly misrepresented his 
dealings with police; each time Farr responded untruthfully, the prosecution allowed his testi- 
mony to stand uncorrected."). 
108. See Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective 
Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1151 (1982) ("In terms of truth-seeking, there is 
frequently no real difference between the jury's hearing perjury and its failing to hear significant 
favorable evidence."). 
109. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. 
110. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 42-49. ?he trial judge also found Hmimssa 
was "not credible" during his testimony at the December 12, 2003 hearing. Id. at 2 n.1. 
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operating witnesses such as Hmimssa has a powerful impact on the 
jury. No other witness has such an extraordinary incentive to lie.lll 
For the prosecutor, the cooperating witness often provides the most 
damaging evidence against a defendant, is usually capable of lying 
convincingly, and typically is believed by the jury.l12 
There is ample evidence that the prosecution concealed from the 
jury information suggesting that Hmimssa gave untruthful testimony. 
An undisclosed letter to the prosecution from a prison inmate, Milton 
"Butch" Jones, related a series of jail house conversations with Hmim- 
ssa in which Hmimssa made statements that contradicted much of his 
testimony.113 Hmimssa portrayed himself on the witness stand as a 
person sympathetic to the United States.114 However, Jones claimed 
that Hmimssa bragged about "fooling the FBI and the Secret Ser- 
vice," "expressed hostility toward President Bush and Attorney Gen- 
eral Ashcroft, asserted that God would punish the United States for 
its actions in Afghanistan, indicated a desire to hurt the United States 
economy through fraud, [and] boasted" that he sold false identifica- 
tion documents to the September 11 hijackers.l15 
Other undisclosed evidence corroborates Jones' statement that 
Hmimssa "harbored anti-American views and . . . vehemently op- 
posed the United States' involvement in Afghanistan." For example, 
the prosecution did not disclose a copy of a newspaper article found in 
the trash at Hmimssa's apartment as a "photograph of Northern Alli- 
ance fighters over which was written 'BAD MUSLIMS.'"116 Also not 
disclosed was the identity of a witness, the manager of the apartment 
where Hmimssa lived, who stated that Hmimssa told him: "Any sol- 
dier who lands in Afghanistan will die.""' 
111. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 
747, 757 (1952). 
112. Yaroshefsky, supra note 6, at 918-21 (describing dangers of using cooperating witnesses 
from extensive interviews with former federal prosecutors). It appears that the Detroit jury did 
not completely believe Hmimssa's testimony. In a telephone conversation with Richard M. Hcl- 
frick, Esq., attorney for defendant Koubriti, Mr. Helfrick suggested that in post-trial interviews, 
some jurors had expressed reservations about Hmimssa's credibility. Moreover, after news sto- 
ries revealed the government's doubts over Hmimssa's veracity, several jurors sought to speak to 
the trial judge to express concerns about their verdict. Telephone Interview with Richard M. 
Helfrick, Esq. (Oct. 7, 2004). 
113. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 44-45. "[Tlhe Criminal Chief of the Detroit 
U.S. Attorney's Office described the need to disclose this [letter] to the defense as a 'no 
brainer."' Id. at 44 (quoting 12-12-03 Tr. 71 (Allen), 83 (Gershel)). ?he court observed that this 
letter "clearly contains . . . exculpatory and impeachment material," and that "there is 'no ques- 
tion in the Court's mind that this document should have been turned over."' Id. at 44-45 (quot- 
ing 12-12-30 Tr. 167). 
114. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
115. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 44. 
116. Id. at 45. 
117. Id. Hmimssa also may have given false testimony when he stated that defendant 
Elmardoudi had given him a flight school visa so that Hmirnssa could learn the necessary fight 
codes and fight school information in order to create false flight school visas for terrorists in the 
future. However, the testimony of other witnesses suggests that Hmimssa received visas from 
them for the purpose of falsifying them to enable these people to obtain employment. Id. at 26. 
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The impact on the jury of Hmimssa's testimony was aggravated 
by the prosecution's conduct in eliciting testimony from Hmimssa sug- 
gesting his courage and resolve in cooperating with the Government 
against the defendants. Thus, in response to the prosecutor's ques- 
tions, Hmimssa acknowledged that he was putting his life in danger by 
testifying.lls Hmimssa also testified that he was escorted by sixteen 
United States marshals and had to wear a bulletproof vest.H9 He fur- 
ther testified that when he got out of jail his life would be in danger 
from the defendants' worldwide network.120 
C .  Eyewitness Testimony 
In addition to cooperating witnesses, other types of witnesses 
pose difficult fact-finding challenges for even the most conscientious 
and intelligent jury. Identification witnesses have been viewed as 
among the most inherently unreliable ~i tnesses. l2~ The United States 
Supreme Court has described the danger posed by identification wit- 
nesses: "The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the 
annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identifica- 
tion."122 Commentators have suggested that mistakes by identifica- 
tion witnesses may be the single largest cause of jury error.lZ3 
There is ample evidence to suggest that the identification testi- 
mony of Caroline Fuhr Sadowski was mistaken. It was critical for the 
prosecution to establish some connection between the defendants and 
Ali Ahmed in order to support the theory that Ali Ahmed had been 
duped into signing the notebook containing the two sketches. The 
prosecution knew that the local police had investigated this incident, 
and that Thamis Zaia had called the police admitting he was the per- 
son who purchased the cigarettes.124 The prosecution also knew that 
118. See Defendants' Motion, supra note 62, at 33. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. It is not clear how much weight the jury gave to Hmimssa's testimony. Post-trial 
interviews with jurors suggest that the jury accepted Hmimssa's testimony only "when it was 
corroborated by other evidence." Ronald J. Hansen! Jury Weighs Key Witness Testimony 
Lighlly; Jurors Examined Case on Its Merit, Ignored the Charged National Backdrop, They Said, 
DETROIT NEWS, June 4,2003, at 6A. 
121. FEI.IX FRANKFIJRTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30 (1927) ("[Tlhe identifica- 
tion of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are established by 
a formidable number of instances in the records of English and American trials."); Jennifer L. 
Devenport et al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence, Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 338 (1997) (noting that "both archival studies and psychological 
research suggest that eyewitnesses are frequently mistaken in their identifications"). 
122. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). 
123. Rattner, supra note 6, at 289 (describing a study of morc than two hundred felony cases 
of wrongful conviction that found misidentification to be the single largest sourcc of error, ac- 
counting for more than half of the cases that had one main error). 
124. Defendants' Motion, supra note 62, at 30 ("The Government knew that the local police 
had conducted an investigation of this incident" and "knew that Thamis Zaia had called the 
Farmington Hills police and admitted he was the person with Ali Ahmed at Sam's Club."); see 
also Government Motion, supra note 15, a t  54-55 (stating that since trial, Zaia has told agents 
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Zaia had a history of illegal activity involving cigarettes.125 Sadow- 
ski's positive identification of defendant Koubriti as the man with Ah- 
med at Sam's Club is inconsistent with information known by the 
prosecution that suggested that Zaia was the person who accompanied 
Ahmed. 
D. Partisan Experts 
A prosecutor's use of experts typically provides the government 
with distinct ad~an tages . '~~  "First, in contrast with other types of wit- 
nesses, the expert usually is viewed by the jury with an 'aura of special 
reliability and tr~stworthiness.'"'~~ Second, the expert usually pos- 
sesses impressive credentials, which the prosecutor meticulously elicits 
and that reinforce the jury's confidence in the expert's opinion. Third, 
the expert usually is adept at testifying, and communicates her theory 
and conclusions articulately, persuasively, and in language that lay ju- 
rors can understand. Fourth, the expert's conclusions invariably inter- 
lock with other evidence in the case and corroborate the prosecution's 
theory of guilt. Thus, the expert, more than any other witness who 
testifies in a United States courtroom, possesses the greatest capacity 
to mislead the jury. In tandem with a prosecutor who zealously seeks 
a conviction, the expert can often secure that conviction. 
Special FBI Agent Paul George, who testified as a "summary ex- 
pert," clearly made a powerful impression on the jury. Relying on the 
sketches, videotape, and Hmimssa's testimony, George opined that 
the defendants operated a terrorist cell that was "going to strike out 
against, against the United .States and abroad."l28 He described the 
sketches and videotape as "casing material" that "clearly shows this is 
a repository of intelligence [containing] operational terrorist mate- 
ria1."129 George also "testified that [defendant] Koubriti had a 'lead- 
ership role' based on [his] 'language abilities' and 'leadership 
pers0nality."'l3~ Relying on the testimony of Hmimssa that Koubriti 
threatened to kill him if he was an informant, George opined that 
"[lleaders will react more impulsively. This, again, is why they are 
leaders . . . . "131 George further testified that defendant Mardoudi 
also had a leadership role "based on his ability to communicate inter- 
who were unaware of Zaia's involvement in the Koubriti matter "that he was present with Ali 
Ahmed at Sam's Club and that Koubriti (whom Zaia does not know) was not"). 
125. Government Motion, sunra note 15, at 54. 
126. Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. C r n  U. 
L. REV. 17, 29 (2003). 
127. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148. 1152 19th Cir. 1973). 
128. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
130. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 12 n.4 (quoting 25 Tr. 4516-17). 
131. Id. (quoting 25 Tr. 4518). 
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nationally." He characterized defendants Hannan and Ali-Haimoud 
"as simply involved group members."132 
George's analysis, in retrospect, seems ludicrous. Indeed, as the 
Government has conceded, subsequent events have "undermined 
each part of [his testimony]."133 It appears that he gave the prosecu- 
tion the "expert opinions" that it wanted to hear.134 Moreover, the 
basis for his opinions is almost laughable. George explained that he 
reached his opinions by asking whether the sketches "could be a cas- 
ing sketch," whether the sketches "were consistent with a place in the 
real world," and whether the sketched location "[was] a possible ter- 
rorist target."135 Whereas to some observers the drawing looked like 
childish doodles,136 George concluded that the "drawing looked like it 
depicted something that could exist."13' As the Government's memo- 
randum observed, however, George's three-step formula presumably 
would have led him to characterize a child's sketch of the Empire 
State Building as an "operational terrorist casing sketch."138 Finally, 
as the Government has acknowledged, the "vulnerability" of George's 
analysis is further underscored by the failure of George to evaluate 
the training level of the sketch artist, one of the bases upon which the 
Turkish National Police and the CIA discounted the sketches as ter- 
rorist-related.139 
E. Coaching Witnesses 
Witness coaching has been described as the "darkv-some have 
even called it "dirtyv-secret of the United States adversary sys- 
tem.140 It is a practice that, more than anything else, has given trial 
lawyers a reputation as shifty, and is maybe solely responsible for pro- 
ducing erroneous verdicts.141 It is indisputable that some prosecutors 
coach witnesses with the deliberate objective of presenting false and 
132. Id.  (quoting 25 Tr. 4516). 
133. Id. at 13. 
134. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text. 
135. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
136. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at  32-33 (Agent Thomas allegedly was in- 
formed by Nasser Ahmed, a Yemeni man, that his mentally unstable brother, Ali Ahmed, might 
have been doodling in the day planner and drawn a sketch of the Middle East.). 
137. See id. at 15 (quoting 25 Tr. 4538-39). 
138. See id. at 15, 16 n.6. 
139. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
140. See John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277,279 (1989) ('LWitness 
preparation is treated as one of the dark secrets of the legal profession."); Roberta K. Flowers, 
What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecu- 
tors, 63 M o .  L. REV. 699, 740 (1998) (describing witness preparation as "The Profession's Dirty 
Little Secret"). 
141. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching By Prosecufors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
829 (2002) (analyzing the incentives for prosecutors to coach witnesses and discussing methods 
of detection and prevention). 
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misleading testimony.142 And given the secrecy surrounding the pros- 
ecutor's preparation of his witnesses, it is virtually impossible to ascer- 
tain whether and to what extent witnesses have been coached by 
prosecutors and p01ice.l~~ 
It appears that the prosecutor shaped the testimony of several of 
his witnesses by improper coaching tactics. For example, during his 
direct examination of witnesses, the prosecutor elicited highly prejudi- 
cial testimony that the witnesses were being given special security pro- 
t e ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  Such inflammatory testimony was obviously planned in 
advance and had the logical effect of prejudicing the jury either con- 
sciously or unconsciously. Indeed, the security measures described by 
Hrnimssa could reasonably have led the most fair-minded jury to be- 
lieve that the United States Marshal Service was convinced a terror 
network connected to the defendants was attempting to intimidate 
Government witnesses and posed a real threat to Hmimssa and the 
members of the jury. 
In addition, the evolution over time of Hmimssa's testimony pro- 
vides a strong reason to believe he was coached to improve his testi- 
mony. As described in the Government's memorandum,145 Hmimssa, 
in an early version of his story, stated that the defendants were going 
to purchase weapons from a "black male in Detroit."146 A second 
version changed and amplified his story, so that he now stated that a 
"black muslim male in Detroit was going to purchase and ship weap- 
ons to the GIA [a terrorist group] in Algeria."l47 A third version ad- 
ded the word "brother" from whom the defendants were going to 
purchase weapons; the term "brother," according to Hmimssa, was 
used to define Islamists who are politically active.148 In addition, 
142. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675 (2004) (prosecutor suppressed evidence 
that "witness' trial testimony had been intensively coached by prosecutors and law enforcement 
officers"); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 443 (1995) (noting that the differences between the 
original story and the trial testimony of the prosecution's key identification witness would have 
raised "a substantial implication that the prosecutor had coached h ~ m  to give ~t."); Alcorta v. 
Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 30-31 (1957) (witness's misleading testimony obviously coached by prosecu- 
tor to avoid damaging implications); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 
1992) (accomplice's false testimony undoubtedly resulted from careful coaching by prosecutor). 
143. Gershman, supra note 141, at 851 (explaining the difficulty presented by the absence of 
any verbatim record or other documentation of interview sessions as well as limited capacity of 
cross-examination to expose improper witness preparation). 
144. See Defendants' Motion, supra note 62, at 34. 
145. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 48 n.31. 
146. Id. at 48 n.31. Hmimssa stated, "Koubriti, Hannan and Ali-Hammoud all wanted to 
train for Jihad in the U.S. In particular, Ali-Hammoud said he had seen a cache of weapons 
from a black male in Detroit and was going to purchase weapons, including fully automatic 
machine guns." Id. 
147. Id. Hmimmsa stated, "Koubriti, Hannan and Ali Hammoud all wanted to train for 
Jihad in the U.S. In particular, Al-Hammoud said he had seen a cache of weapons from a black 
Muslin male in Detroit and was going to purchase and ship weapons to the CIA in Algeria, 
including fully automatic machine guns and weapons with laser sights." Id. 
148. Id. at  49. Hmimssa stated, "Koubriti, Hannan and Ali-Hammoud all wanted to train for 
Jihad in the U.S. In particular, Ali-Hammoud said he had seen a cache of weapons from a 
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Hmimssa's versions changed to excise earlier statements that sug- 
gested that the defendants were involved in alien smuggling, not ter- 
rorist attacks.149 
F .  Obstructing. Cross- Exuminution 
Cross-examination is assumed to be the most important adver- 
sarial safeguard to ascertaining the truth.150 One of the principal tech- 
niques of cross-examination is to confront a witness with statements 
the witness may have made prior to trial for the purpose of demon- 
strating that the witness previously said something that is inconsistent 
with his trial testimony and, therefore, the witness is not trustwor- 
thy.151 For this purpose a prosecutor is legally obligated to disclose 
prior statements by his witness to the defense.152 If a prosecutor limits 
the availability of such prior statements, the prosecutor has effectively 
prevented the defense from demonstrating the unreliability of the wit- 
ness and consequently impedes the ability of the jury to make an accu- 
rate assessment of the witness's ~redibi1ity.l~~ 
The prosecution's nondisclosure of critical evidence bearing on 
Hmimssa's credibility was compounded by its decision to limit the 
transcription of statements made by Hmimssa during debriefings after 
he began to cooperate with the Government. As the Government's 
memorandum acknowledged, "[Tlhe [prosecutor] made a deliberate 
decision not to have the FBI take any notes or prepare any memo- 
brother in Detroit and was going to purchase and ship weapons to the GIA in Algeria, including 
fully automatic machine guns and weapons with laser sights." Id. (quoting 14 Tr. 2465). 
149. Id. Hmimssa omitted in his final version a reference to the defendants' "smuggl[ing] 
people from Canada to the U.S. via boat," thereby giving the impression that the defendants 
were casing the Ambassador Bridge not for the purpose of alien smuggling but to further a 
terrorist attack. Id. at  49 n.31. 
150. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 8 1367, at 32 (James 
H. Chadbourne rev., 1974) (describing cross-examination as "the greatest legal engine ever in- 
vented for the discovery of truth"). 
151.  See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE Q 33, at  122-25 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) 
("most frequently employed" impeachment technique is proving "that the witness on a previous 
occasion has made statements inconsistent with his present testimony"). 
152. See, e.g., The Jencks Act. 18 U.S.C. S 3500 (1993). Under the Jencks Act, these state- 
ments include (1) writtcn statements made by the witness that are "signed or otherwise adopted 
or approved" by the witness: (2) statements that contain a "substantially verbatim recital o f '  any 
oral statement made by the "witness and recorded contemporaneously with thc making of such 
statement"; or (3) a statement made by the witness to a grand jury. Id. 5 3500(e). Due process 
also requires disclosure of witness statements which relate to the witness's testimony and are 
materially favorable to the defendant either to impeach the witness or exculpate the defendant. 
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). 
153. Neither the police nor the prosecutor has any legal obligation to record witness inter- 
views. United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 859-60 (9th Cir. 1980). Some prosecutors and 
police as a mattcr of policy do not take notes specifically to avoid creating contradictory evi- 
dence. Yaroshefsky, supra note 6, at  961 (Prosecutors comrncnted that the office lore is "don't 
take too many notes or figure out how to take notes so that they are mcaningful to you and no 
one else. You do not want a complete set of materials that you have to disclose."). Moreover, 
notes may be withheld from the defense even if they contain significant impeachment evidence 
when it is shown that the notes are selections, summaries, or interpretations by the government 
agent. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1959). 
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randa of these sessions in order to limit defense counsel's ability to 
cross-examine H m i m ~ s a . " ' ~ ~  "There were at least 10 undocumented 
interviews" with Hmimssa "that took place over 20 to 30 
The prosecutor took his own notes but then claimed that all interviews 
with Hmimssa were for "'witness preparation' and that his own notes 
were privileged and not di~coverable."l5~ 
Moreover, in response to defense complaints about the Govern- 
ment's failure to document the interviews with Hmimssa, several pros- 
ecution witnesses gave the misleading impression that their note- 
taking practices "followed normal government procedures," and they 
denied, falsely, that they were instructed by the prosecutor not to take 
notes.157 As the Government's memorandum acknowledged, "[Tlhe 
[prosecutor's] approach to documenting Hmimssa's cooperation pre- 
vented defendants from determining the extent to which, if any, his 
testimony changed over time."158 
G.  Inflammatory Arguments 
The prosecutor has a unique status in the eyes of the jury and 
therefore a unique opportunity to mislead and prejudice the jury. Be- 
cause the prosecutor is the attorney for the government, he ordinarily 
is viewed by the jury as a highly knowledgeable official "who can be 
trusted to use the facts responsibly."l5Y Courts have recognized the 
jury's respect for the prosecutor's prestige and expertise, and the 
jury's confidence in the prosecutor's judgment rather than its own 
view of the evidence. The United States Supreme Court has observed 
that "the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the 
Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's judg- 
ment rather than its own view of the evidence."l60 
154. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 46. Apparently agents took notes of early 
"proffer" sessions with Hmimssa. However, "once [he] began cooperating in mid-March 2002, 
the . . . agents did not take any notes or prepare any. . . memoranda." Id. at 46 11.28 (citing 8 Tr. 
1253-54). 
155. Id. at 46, 11.28 (quoting 8 Tr. 1253). 
156. Id. at 46. "Likewise, Hmimssa was not called before the Grand Jury" and therefore 
gave no documented prior testimony. Id. Apparently the prosecutor was "cautioned" against 
this approach by officials in the Justice Department and the Detroit United States Attorney's 
Office. Id. 
157. Id. at 47 (citing 9 Tr. 1369, 26 Tr. 4667-73, 8 Tr. 1177). Although Thomas specifically 
denied being instructed not to take notes, Agent George recently indicated, in direct contrast to 
Thomas's trial testimony, that the prosecutor did specifically direct Thomas not to take notes. 
Id. (citing 3/17/04 George Statement, at 8). 
158. Id. at 48. Moreover, "although [the prosecutor] provided the [trial] court with a version 
of his typewritten notes, other typed versions . . . recently surfaced." Id. 
159. Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 CEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 
315 (2001). 
160. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985); see also United States v. Modica, 663 
F.2d 1173 (2d Cir. 1981). 
The prosecutor is cloaked with the authority of the United States Government; he 
stands before the jury as the community's representative. His remarks are those, not 
simply of an advocate, but rather of a federal official duty-bound to see that justice is 
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As the Government's memorandum acknowledged, the prosecu- 
tor's arguments to the jury were indefensible and had the potential to 
mislead and inflame the jury.16' Although there was no evidence that 
the defendants committed terrorist acts or were tied to any specific 
terrorist organization, the prosecutor in his opening statement re- 
ferred to the defendants as a "'shadowy group' that 'stayed in the 
weeds' [and were] 'planning, seeking direction, awaiting the cal1."'l62 
These comments, made at the outset of the trial, grossly misrepre- 
sented the evidence, and in a climate of fear and tension, were delib- 
erately designed to prejudice the jury?' 
Even more inflammatory were the prosecutor's insinuations dur- 
ing his summation that if the jurors did not convict the defendants, 
innocent people would peri~h.16~ The prosecutor stated: "Don't give 
these people another chance to make their plan effe~tive."l6~ Refer- 
ring to the defendants' potential victims-i.e., "'the mother and father 
in the ride in the Disneyworld underground,' the 'soldier in Incirlik, 
Turkey, who takes a plane off,' 'the people from Amman, Jordan who 
go to that hospital,' 'the people in Las Vegas in the lobbies of hotels,' 
'the person walking into the New York Times Building' "-the prose- 
cutor insinuated, in clear violation of legal and ethical rules, that ac- 
quitting the defendants would invite the murder of these innocent 
people.166 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Detroit terror case offers a unique opportunity to examine 
closely the vulnerability of the fact-finding process when an intrinsi- 
cally fair-minded and conscientious jury is exposed extrinsically to un- 
truthful, incomplete, and misleading evidence and argument. Given 
the Government's unusual concession that the defendants received an 
unfair trial, and its careful description of the quality of the evidence 
and the manner in which it was presented and argued, the conclusion 
is inescapable that any intrinsically competent jury will almost always 
make the wrong decision when its verdict is based on extrinsically de- 
fective information which the jury lacks the competence to expose. 
done. . . [I]t may be difficult for [the jurors] to ignore his views, however biased and 
baseless they may in fact be. 
Id. at 1178-79. 
161. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 57-58. 
162. Id. at 10-11 (quoting 8 Tr. 1023-24). 
163. See generally Pyszczynski & Wrightsman, supra note 8 (describing impact of opening 
statements on mock jurors). 
164. See GERSHMAN, supra note 68, at $0 11:2-11:lO (describing various arguments used by 
prosecutors to inflame fears, passions, and prejudices of the jury). 
165. See Government Motion, supra note 15, at 57. 
166. See id. at 57-58: GEKSHMAN, supra note 68, at $8 11:4-115. 
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The Detroit terrorist trial contained many of the ingredients that 
produce a miscarriage of justice. The trial was conducted in a climate 
of fear; the jury was selected anonymously and subjected to intense 
pressure to convict; the evidence that the Government presented to 
the jury was fraudulent; and the prosecution used inflammatory tactics 
to incite the jury to convict. Undoubtedly, psychological investiga- 
tions of the intrinsic factors that affect jury decision-making are use- 
ful. However, any close analysis of jury verdicts must focus on those 
extrinsic factors that relate to the quality of the evidence and the man- 
ner of its presentation. As the Detroit verdict unmistakably shows, 
even a qualified, diligent, and carefully selected jury will get it wrong 
when it is secretly misled and misinformed by a partisan advocate bent 
on winning at all costs. 
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